Three Years On: Israel's Military Campaign in Gaza Has Failed to Deliver Its Stated Political Goals, Analysts Say

Nearly three years after the October 7 attack that reshaped the region, Israel's massive military campaign in Gaza has yet to translate overwhelming firepower into the political outcomes its government promised, according to an analysis published by Al Jazeera. The opinion piece, written by Refaat Ibrahim, argues that the scale of death and destruction does not equate to strategic victory, and that Israel now confronts a "day after" problem it cannot solve by force alone.

The war, described in the article as genocidal, has produced a staggering humanitarian toll. More than 74,000 Palestinians have been killed and over 180,000 injured, while the entire population has been subjected to starvation. The healthcare system has collapsed, the education system has been devastated, and most of Gaza's life-sustaining infrastructure — including water treatment and desalination plants and the electricity grid — has been destroyed. The article notes that Israel deployed all its military power short of nuclear weapons and mobilized Western allies in what it calls an unprecedented campaign of death and destruction.

Yet the central argument of the piece is that military power must be judged by whether it achieves political objectives, not by body counts or the extent of ruin. By that standard, the author contends, Israel has fallen short on nearly every stated aim. At the outset, the Israeli government said it intended to free the captives, eliminate the Palestinian resistance, impose security control over Gaza, and establish an alternative administration — while, according to the article, tacitly preparing the ground for the eventual expulsion of Palestinians.

On the captives issue, the record is stark. Of the roughly 250 people taken to Gaza, the Israeli army managed to free only eight and recover the bodies of another 12. It shot dead at least three and killed an unknown number of others during bombing operations. The vast majority — both living and dead — were released through intense diplomacy and negotiations with Hamas. The article points to a recent statement by Israel's former point man on the captives issue, who said all October 7 captives could have been returned a year earlier and that some who died could have been saved. The author presents this as clear evidence that overwhelming military force failed in the captives file.

Similarly, Israel has been unable to end the presence of the Palestinian resistance in Gaza despite extensive operations and the assassination of many of its leaders. Hamas continues to control parts of the Strip even while facing ongoing Israeli bombing and attacks by pro-Israel Palestinian militias. The article argues that Israel has now been forced to negotiate Hamas's disarmament rather than achieve it by force — a significant reversal of its stated ambitions.

Militarily, the Israeli army has occupied about 60 percent of Gaza but has stopped short of a full takeover of the remaining territory. According to the analysis, this restraint reflects an understanding that the political, humanitarian, and military costs of such an operation would be too high. The result is a partial occupation that neither eliminates the resistance nor provides a durable security solution.

Diplomatically, Israel and its foremost ally, the United States, invested heavily in creating the Board of Peace and a plan for reconstruction and an alternative administration that deliberately excludes the United Nations. That effort has largely failed, the article says. The administrative committee for Gaza has not entered the territory to take over governing, and the humanitarian provisions of the agreement remain unimplemented. The vision of a post-Hamas governance structure backed by Washington has yet to materialize on the ground.

The article also addresses the long-discussed prospect of mass expulsion. Israel has tried to push Palestinians out through repeated displacement, starvation, home demolitions, infrastructure destruction, and various "voluntary departure" schemes. Destruction has rendered the Strip unlivable, but the majority of the Palestinian population has made clear it intends to stay. Some have even returned from Egypt, underscoring the failure of pressure tactics to trigger a mass exodus.

The author concludes that Israel faces an insoluble "day after" problem in Gaza. Its military can raze the territory but cannot construct a new political reality that satisfies Israeli aims. The hope that reducing Gaza to an apocalyptic landscape would push the population into abandoning its cause and rights has been dashed. The continued presence of Palestinians, the persistence of resistance, and the growing international prominence of the Palestinian cause all demonstrate, in the author's view, that the strategy of brutal aggression has failed.

Beyond Gaza, the article argues that military power can impose a temporary reality but cannot manufacture political legitimacy — and can actually destroy it. That, it says, is what has happened to the Israeli government and the broader Israeli project. Last month, when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed the UN General Assembly, representatives of the majority of UN member states walked out of the hall. Netanyahu also faces an arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Israel's international standing has suffered broadly, according to the piece. A Pew Research survey across 36 countries found that 67 percent of adults view the country unfavorably. In key allied nations, negative perceptions are even higher: 60 percent in the United States, 73 percent in Germany, 69 percent in the United Kingdom, and 68 percent in France. In Washington, debate over support for Israel has intensified, with a growing number of lawmakers backing bills that would curb military aid or impose sanctions.

Taken together, the analysis portrays a widening gap between Israel's military dominance and its political isolation. Three years of war have not delivered the captives through force, nor dismantled the resistance, nor installed a viable alternative administration, nor driven Palestinians from their land. Instead, the article argues, they have left Israel with a ruined territory it cannot govern, a foe it must negotiate with, and a global reputation in steady decline — outcomes that no amount of firepower appears able to reverse.