Pezeshkian says Tehran's trust in US talks has broken down, hours after Trump snubs Hormuz reopening plan

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has told Al Jazeera that Tehran no longer has confidence in negotiations with Washington, saying previous rounds of diplomacy were followed first by attacks and then by sanctions. In the interview, published on 26 September 2026, the Iranian president framed the current moment as one in which the United States has forfeited the credibility it built at the negotiating table.

The remarks land at a particularly volatile moment. They came shortly after President Donald Trump rejected an Iranian proposal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz within seven days — a demand that, had it been accepted, would have marked an abrupt de-escalation in one of the most consequential economic and military flashpoints in the region. The rejection means the two sides are now further apart, not closer, on the one measure that both governments had appeared to prize.

The Strait of Hormuz is the narrow waterway through which a substantial share of the world's oil shipments passes, which is why the closure dispute has become a global concern rather than a bilateral one. Al Jazeera's coverage of the crisis includes a dedicated explainer tracking "what has happened since the US-Iran MoU on June 17," underlining that the current standoff is the outcome of a process that once appeared to be moving towards an accommodation. Whatever memorandum of understanding was reached in mid-June has since been overtaken by escalation.

That escalation is reflected in the wider editorial focus of the network's coverage, which currently tags the conflict as a "US-Israel war on Iran." Alongside the Hormuz file, related coverage examines why strikes have resumed and what that means for peace talks — a question that sits directly beneath Pezeshkian's interview. His central claim is not merely that talks are difficult, but that the premise of talks has been called into question by Washington's own conduct.

The distrust narrative is also shaped by unresolved military questions. Al Jazeera has published an assessment of claims that Iran captured a US submarine, examining what is actually known about the fate of the vessel. Such reporting underscores the atmosphere of mutual uncertainty that now surrounds the confrontation: each side is operating on incomplete information, and the information environment itself has become a source of risk rather than clarity.

For Pezeshkian, the sequencing matters. In his account, the pattern is consistent — engagement, followed by coercion. That framing is politically useful inside Iran because it offers an explanation for economic pressure and security risk that does not require Tehran to be seen as the party that walked away. It also pre-empts the argument that Iran's positions are unreasonable, by locating the breakdown in American behaviour rather than in Iranian demands.

Diplomatically, a declaration that talks are no longer trusted is a serious signal. It narrows the political space for compromise in Tehran, and it puts additional pressure on intermediaries in the region who may still be attempting to keep channels open. Restoring confidence would likely require concrete, verifiable steps rather than statements: a durable halt to strikes, an end to sanctions pressure, and clear guarantees about the future of the Strait.

The wider diplomatic stage on the same day makes Tehran's position look unusually isolated. Saudi Arabia's foreign minister accused Iran of "flagrant attacks" and condemned the Houthis at the UN General Assembly, sharpening the sectarian framing of the crisis. Cuba, meanwhile, accused the United States at the UN of deliberately inflicting humanitarian suffering. In the same UNGA cycle, Washington is being accused of causing civilian harm, while Tehran is being accused of regional aggression — leaving both governments defending themselves before a body that appears unmoved by either argument.

That contrast is precisely what Pezeshkian appears to be contesting. If the American case rests on Iranian attacks and Iranian defiance, his answer is that Tehran responded to a sequence of American provocations, and that the sanctions and strikes were the continuation of the conflict by other means. It is a defensive argument dressed as a strategic one.

Attention now turns to what happens next. The seven-day Hormuz proposal has been rejected, and the language of trust has been withdrawn. Those two developments point in the same direction: away from a quick resolution and towards a longer standoff in which the waterway, the sanctions regime and the strikes themselves become instruments of pressure rather than points of agreement.

There is, however, a gap between rhetoric and policy that should not be overlooked. Governments frequently signal the end of confidence while still needing the talks to resume, and the same president who declares distrust may, under domestic or economic pressure, accept a reopening of the channel within weeks. Pezeshkian's comments are best read as a marker of Iran's current bottom line, not as a final door closing.

What would change that assessment? Any verifiable American move on sanctions, any confirmed de-escalation around the Strait, or any resumption of direct contact between Tehran and Washington. Absent one of those, the near-term expectation is more of the same: rhetoric from Tehran hardening, proposals from Washington unmet, and a region that remains a single escalation away from a much wider conflict.