Sudan's Kordofan Region Emerges as Critical Battleground in Fourth Year of War

The Kordofan region of Sudan has become one of the most fiercely contested theaters in the country's civil war, now entering its fourth year, as government forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces vie for control of a strategic corridor connecting the nation's eastern and western halves.

Kordofan, a vast area encompassing North, West and South Kordofan states, occupies a pivotal geographic position where the two warring sides' territories converge. The army maintains its grip on Sudan's central, northern and eastern regions, while the RSF dominates the western Darfur region. This geography has transformed Kordofan into a natural flashpoint, with fighting intensifying dramatically since late 2025.

The Sudanese Armed Forces have recently succeeded in pushing RSF fighters out of significant portions of North Kordofan, according to an analysis of conflict data. This development marks a notable shift in the front lines, though the broader struggle for the region remains far from resolved.

The nature of combat in Kordofan has evolved significantly over the course of the conflict. What was once primarily a ground war has increasingly become an aerial one. Drone strikes targeting towns across North Kordofan have grown more frequent and more deadly, with civilian infrastructure regularly caught in the crossfire. The use of unmanned aerial vehicles has introduced a new dimension of danger for civilians who had already endured years of displacement and hardship.

Data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project, an independent monitor of global conflicts, reveals the extraordinary scale of violence concentrated in Kordofan. Between the war's outbreak on April 15, 2023, and September 19, 2026, the country recorded 14,648 attacks. Kordofan's three states accounted for 2,876 of these incidents, representing nearly one-fifth of all recorded attacks nationwide.

When considered collectively, Kordofan trails only the capital region of Khartoum in terms of attack frequency. Khartoum has witnessed 5,719 attacks, or 39 percent of the national total—nearly three times the number recorded in North Darfur, which ranks second among individual states with 1,999 attacks. Gezira state follows with 1,435 attacks, representing 9.8 percent of the total.

Within Kordofan itself, North Kordofan has borne the heaviest burden, recording 1,205 attacks, or 44 percent of the region's total. South Kordofan has seen 789 attacks, while West Kordofan recorded 723. The disputed oil-rich Abyei region, historically considered part of Kordofan, adds another 158 attacks to the regional count.

The intensity of violence varies considerably across Kordofan's localities. In North Kordofan, the Sheikan locality alone accounts for 497 attacks—41 percent of the state's total. This concentration reflects Sheikan's strategic importance, as it contains the state capital of el-Obeid, a commercial and administrative center that serves as a vital link between central Sudan and the western regions. Military analysts suggest that if the RSF were to capture el-Obeid, it would open a direct route eastward toward Khartoum.

Civilians in the region have paid a devastating price. On September 9, a drone strike hit a college in el-Obeid, tearing off the building's roof and killing a security guard. The dean of the college, Abdel Aziz al-Sheikh, confirmed the attack to international media. The strike came just one day after students had taken exams at the facility.

Omnia Aboul Gassim, a student who had sat her examinations at the college the day before the attack, described the destruction to Reuters. She said the entire faculty building had been destroyed and spoke of dreams and futures being shattered by the violence.

In South Kordofan, the Dilling locality has emerged as the primary hotspot, recording 242 attacks, or 31 percent of the state's total. The state capital of Kadugli follows with 107 attacks, while Al Quoz recorded 94. South Kordofan remains the most contested of the three Kordofan states, with smaller armed groups maintaining pockets of territory in the south.

West Kordofan has experienced a more geographically dispersed pattern of violence, with attacks spread relatively evenly across its localities. Babnusa recorded the highest number with 142 attacks, followed closely by En Nuhud with 119, Al Khiwai with 112, and Abu Zabad with 111.

The responsibility for the violence is shared, though not equally. The SAF has been associated with just over half of all recorded attacks nationwide—52 percent—while the RSF accounts for 34.7 percent. Other armed actors are responsible for the remaining 13.3 percent.

The pattern of responsibility has shifted over time. During the first year and a half of the conflict, the SAF was linked to more attacks than the RSF. However, from late 2024 through mid-2025, the RSF surpassed the army in monthly attack counts. Since August 2025, the two sides have recorded similar numbers of monthly attacks, with the SAF generally maintaining a slight edge, even as the overall volume of attacks has declined sharply.

The strategic significance of Kordofan extends beyond its current role as a battleground. The region forms a natural land bridge between the RSF-controlled Darfur region and the army-held central, northern and eastern territories. Control of this corridor would provide either side with a critical advantage in projecting power across the country.

The fall of el-Fasher, the last major Darfur city held by the army and its allies, in October 2025, marked a turning point that shifted attention toward Kordofan. With Darfur largely consolidated under RSF control, the paramilitary force has turned its focus toward breaking through the corridor that separates it from Sudan's center and east.

For the SAF, holding Kordofan is essential to preventing the RSF from linking its western strongholds with forces that could threaten Khartoum and the Nile Valley heartland. The army's recent successes in North Kordofan represent a significant defensive achievement, though the broader contest remains fluid.

The humanitarian implications of the Kordofan campaign are profound. The region hosts large populations of internally displaced people who have fled violence elsewhere in Sudan, only to find themselves in the path of new offensives. Civilian infrastructure, including educational institutions and medical facilities, has been repeatedly damaged or destroyed.

The international community has struggled to respond effectively to the crisis. Aid organizations have faced access restrictions and security threats that limit their ability to reach affected populations. The drone campaign, in particular, has made humanitarian operations increasingly dangerous, as the distinction between military and civilian targets has blurred.

As the war enters its fourth year, Kordofan stands as a testament to the conflict's intractability. The region's strategic importance ensures that fighting will continue as long as both sides believe victory remains possible. For the civilians caught between these competing forces, the future remains uncertain, with displacement, destruction and fear defining daily life in what was once a thriving crossroads of Sudanese commerce and culture.