suwandi-tan
The annual BRICS summit has concluded in New Delhi with standard commitments to deepen economic cooperation and expand multilateral ties. However, the high-level meeting was defined by a conspicuous omission, as the bloc declined to directly address the ongoing US-Israel military campaign against Iran in its final declaration.
Despite the war affecting a significant number of the bloc’s 11 member nations and 10 partner countries, the joint communique avoided any direct condemnation of the United States. While this restrained phrasing succeeded in keeping all member states under a single diplomatic framework, it underscored the persistent challenges BRICS faces in transforming shared grievances against the Western-led order into synchronized international diplomacy.
The diplomatic impasse in New Delhi was foreshadowed months earlier during preparatory negotiations. In May, a meeting of BRICS foreign ministers held in the Indian capital concluded without a unified statement on the conflict, producing an outcome document that openly acknowledged internal disagreements while carefully avoiding naming either Washington or Israel.
During those earlier discussions, Iranian representatives pushed for the coalition to formally condemn the American and Israeli military campaign. In contrast, the United Arab Emirates resisted language that failed to address Iranian strikes or its own regional security priorities, exposing the friction that exists within the newly expanded organization.
This standoff illustrates the growing geopolitical cost of the bloc’s recent enlargement. While admitting new members has expanded the group's demographic reach and economic footprint, it has simultaneously imported entrenched regional rivalries directly into the organization, creating an inherent barrier to collective action on major crises.
As demonstrated by the New Delhi summit, BRICS functioned primarily as a platform for managing internal dissent rather than presenting a unified front. Analysts observe that the fundamental dilemma facing the coalition is not a deficiency in economic or diplomatic significance, but rather an inability to convert that weight into a cohesive foreign policy mechanism.
The coalition's internal divergence is particularly evident in how individual member states navigate their relationships with Washington. Although BRICS was largely formed out of a shared ambition to challenge American dominance, its members hold sharply contrasting views on how to engage with the United States.
India represents this strategic balancing act most clearly. New Delhi treats BRICS as a tool to preserve its own strategic autonomy rather than as an anti-Western alliance. The Indian government continues to deepen defense and economic partnerships with Washington—including through participation in the Quad—while concurrently maintaining robust diplomatic and trade relations with Moscow and Beijing.
Russia and China similarly have compelling reasons to avoid turning BRICS into an instrument of overt military confrontation with the West. For Moscow, the bloc remains an essential economic buffer against Western sanctions and diplomatic isolation, yet Russian leadership remains cautious about adopting military alliance postures that could trigger direct conflict with the United States and NATO.
Beijing faces an even more intricate set of priorities. While Chinese leaders actively advocate for a multipolar global order, greater representation for the Global South, and reduced reliance on Western-dominated financial institutions, they remain reluctant to risk essential trade relations with the US, which continues to serve as an indispensable export market.
Other prominent members, including Brazil and Indonesia, add further complexity to the group's decision-making process. Brasilia seeks enhanced bargaining leverage for developing nations and reformed global financial structures, but resists allowing the bloc to become an instrument for Chinese or Russian geopolitical interests. Likewise, Jakarta views membership as a way to broaden its economic options rather than take sides in great-power disputes.
This structural dynamic has trapped the organization in what observers describe as a polycentric dilemma. While the coalition's geographic and political diversity provides it with widespread legitimacy across the developing world, that very breadth complicates the process of achieving consensus on contested international security matters.
Consequently, BRICS is evolving more effectively as an economic bargaining coalition than as a unified geopolitical bloc. Member states consistently reach agreements on reforming the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, expanding South-South trade, facilitating local-currency settlements, and enhancing cooperation in energy and food security.
However, finding common ground remains elusive whenever joint action requires members to choose sides in an active armed conflict. The muted response to the war on Iran serves as a clear reflection of these institutional limitations.
Despite these geopolitical constraints, the bloc's inability to form a hardline alliance may offer a strategic advantage. By prioritizing gradual institutional reforms, expanding non-dollar payment systems, and offering developing nations alternative development financing, BRICS continues to reshape the global order incrementally without triggering destabilizing direct confrontations.
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